Sean Tiffee—a Ph.D. candidate in Rhetoric and Language Studies and an Assistant Debate Coach at the University of Texas—has written an interesting post on the UTNIF blog about the role of argumentation in debate.

I made the decision to make my blog post about argumentation for two seemingly contradictory reasons. First, debate evolves at a pace that is simply staggering. The ninth grade debaters of today will be the ones shaping our activity in under a decade. As we all know, debate is a time intensive and life encompassing activity. While there are certainly coaches who have committed their lives to the activity, more and more seem to hit their early to mid 30s and decide they don’t want to lose every weekend for a minimal stipend, which leaves the activity in the hands of 20-somethings. A large-scale commitment of high school debaters to focus on argumentation today means that high school and college debate looks a whole lot different in less than 10 years. Second, as fast as our activity can change, we attempt to innovate among calcified thought. Some of these debates have already been had, they say, and there’s no point in going over them again. I disagree. While some of these debates have been had, it can be a good idea to revisit them with fresh eyes and the benefit of hindsight. In particular, I’d like to revisit a portion of a debate that took place in the Fall 1984 edition of The Journal of the American Forensic Association between Robert Rowland and Walter Ulrich. I know this is old school, but hear me out. Further, in the interest of full disclosure, I intend to cherry pick from these articles in an effort to initiate discussion and encourage you to seek out and read these relatively short articles yourself.

While I do not have the JAFA Rowland and Ulrich articles in my collection, I can share a few related articles that might be of interest to readers:

• Hingstman, David. “The Third Reunion of Argumentation and Debate in the Experiences of Debate Practice,” Argument in Controversy: Proceedings of the Seventh SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation, 1991.
• McGee, Brian. “Judgment after tabula rasa: defending ‘least intervention’,” Contemporary Argumentation & Debate (19), 1998.
• Rowland, Robert. “Debate Paradigms: A Critical Evaluation,” Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation, 1981.
• Ulrich, Walter. “The Influence of the Judge on the Debate Round,” Argument in Transition: Proceedings of the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation, 1983.

If anyone has access to the fall 1984 issue of JAFA, please let me know.

The value of incorporating theory article reading and review into a student’s debate curriculum has been discussed at length in previous articles. One method that coaches can use to encourage students to delve into this literature is to provide a set of guided questions to accompany selected theory articles. In schools with formal debate classes, these short answer questions can be assigned as homework or used as quizzes to confirm that students are keeping up with their assigned reading.

To demonstrate this approach, a set of guided questions for Jim Lyle’s “Getting out of the Cards and into the Arguments: Strategies for Refutation (pdf)” is available below the fold. This article provides a wealth of actionable instruction about refutation techniques and is suggested for debaters of all levels. Coaches, feel free to reuse these questions however you would like.

1. Lyle presents three models for assessing arguments. What are they?

2. According to the Toulmin model, an argument includes six parts. Name them.

3. Despite being “secondary”, the latter three components of an argument are—in Lyle’s opinion—extremely important. Explain why.

4. In the Fisher model, an argument presents a “good story” if it relies on “good reasons” and provides “narrative rationality” (including “narrative probability” and “narrative fidelity”). Explain the Fisher model and define “narrative probability” and “narrative fidelity”.

5. Lyle contends that there are “arguments within arguments”. What does he mean? How can this help a debater improve her refutation skills?

6. “Although an argument may be true,” Lyle writes, “it is only true under certain conditions and these are determined by the qualifiers and rebuttals that are offered with it.” Explain what he means and why he thinks this is important for debaters to understand.

7. Lyle suggests that cross-examination can be used effectively to ‘get out of the cards and into the arguments’. Why is it important to use cross-examination to support your refutation strategies?

8. In the “additional strategies for refutation” section, Lyle outlines six techniques that debaters can use to improve their refutation. List the six techniques and briefly explain them.

Special thanks to Max Tagher from Newburgh Free Academy for cleaning up the original PDF — the version linked above is crystal clear!

Tim Alderete from The Meadows emailed me a card one of his ex debaters cut about education and conditionality (below the fold). I saw this article linked on the dish a few days ago and it seemed to be very debate useful but I didn’t put this particular spin on it. I don’t see a lot of teams read cards on theory arguments, and many judges think it is foolish. Personally I think it is a pretty good strategy, particularly if you are making a big shift in the 1AR to dedicate a lot of time to theory. Judges can call for cards, most won’t call for theory blocks. So in addition to getting some expert opinion into the debate, you give the judge something they can call for and look at after the round. People often don’t realize how important something like that can be to help clarify a rapid fire theory debate.

One thing that has annoyed me a lot recently is the proliferation of a million rapid fire permutations in the 2AC. These things work because oftentimes the other team won’t here them all, or the judge will allow the affirmative to clarify later in the 1AR/2AR what the 3 words said in the 2AC meant and how that avoids the net benefit. So I’ve put together some thoughts on how judges should evaluate permutations and how debaters should respond to them.

Some thoughts on Judging permutations

1. The permutation is really the only argument in debate that judges require no explanation about whatsoever. Even topicality, if extended without an explicit voting issue, judges will have no qualms ignoring. Permutations on the other hand, are just assumed to be important without any impact analysis by the aff at all. Conditionality bad- you have to explain why the negative running a conditional counterplan is illegitimate. That a counterplan has to be “competitive” and that a 3 word argument can prove that it isn’t is just generally assumed. It may seem silly to require the aff to explain why a permutation matters, but the system we use now is clearly broken. Judges default to thinking that it is the neg’s burden to prove both A. the permutation is illegitimate and or links to the net benefit and B. that the net benefit to doing the CP alone is meaningful/outweighs a solvency deficit. In a certain sense, this being the neg burden is reasonable. But when combined with the fact that the average permutation is < 10 words, and that judges give the aff serious leeway in explaining what “do both” means in later speeches this burden is entirely unreasonable. One or the other needs to change. Either

A. there needs to be an expectation that a permutation requires a certain level of coherent explanation before it becomes an argument

or

B. The presumption should be negative that the perm is illegitimate/links to the net benefit until  the aff makes an argument as to why it isn’t/doesn’t.

2. If you were unable to flow the text of the permutation because it was so short/fast and the debater moved onto the next argument so quickly, don’t credit it as an argument. I have been on quite a few panels recently where the judges didn’t get the perms in the 2AC, had no idea what argument the 1AR extended, and then voted aff after an OK 2AR because the neg didn’t do a good job explaining why the CP was competitive. Now granted, the neg could have been more aggressive in saying “this isn’t a coherent argument” or they could of asked in CX, but why is that their burden? I don’t think on any issue other than a permutation would the neg be given this kind of leeway.

3. A ridiculous/illegitimate counterplan should not lower the threshold for voting on a permutation. Some CP’s, say consult, are ridiculous. Lopez is another good example. Their ridiculousness doesn’t necessarily stem from their lack of competition. A well worded lopez CP text that bans the plan correctly is undeniably mutually exclusive. It is still ridiculous because it creates a new fake federal government and has that federal government do the plan. It should be defeated easily by the aff on a theory argument, not a permutation. Many people I have judged with however view a bit of neg fiat egregiousness as carte blanche to vote on awfully explained permutations that just don’t make sense. Obviously you can judge however you want, and if you want to write in your JP that is how you work fine, but no one does. Not explaining that you do and then judging this way is about as legit as lopez.

For 2ns

1. You should all write the following blocks

-short unexplained/vague perms are illegit

-presumption on perms should go neg as a meta level fw- including its aff burden to prove legit/avoids nb

Together they should take about 25 seconds to read. Reading these every round you go for  CP and the 2AC does the 3 perms in 2 seconds strat will save you from untold headaches later.

2. think about/plan for how to handle it in the 2NR when the 1AR radically changes/develops a permutation. Most 2N’s just say “this is new reject it” and move on, which isn’t enough for most judges. You need to think through a well explained objection to what happened, and then think about how you are going to answer it substantively. An example of this is with any agent CP and timeframes for when different agents act. A classic aff shenanigan is to just say “do both” in the 2Ac and then in the 1AR make a series of arguments about how different response times from different agents mean that the perm is something other than immediate simultaneous action by both agents. This has been going on for the last 2 decades, and yet few coaches/debaters spend time thinking about these issues and how to deal with them in the 2NR. Remember the permutation is always going to be the most threating argument from the aff- both because of its actual utility and the importance judges attribute to it.

Consider the following hypothetical:

1AC: Increase food stamps, solves hunger.

1NC: Politics (plan is unpopular and prevents a climate bill from passing—that causes runaway warming), Military Recruitment DA (reducing poverty weakens the recruiting base, tanking hegemony), Case Defense.

2AC: Straight Turns Politics (climate bill will not pass in the status quo, plan is crucial to passage), Answers Military Recruitment DA, Answers Case Defense.

2NC: New Counterplan: Pass Climate Bill. Extends Military Recruitment DA.

1NR: Extends Case Defense / Military Recruitment DA Outweighs The Case.

Three questions:

1. Is the 2NC counterplan—to pass the Climate Bill—legitimate? If yes, why? If not, why not?

2. Is it legitimate for the 1AR to impact turn the Climate Bill (by arguing that the Climate Bill is bad)? If yes, why? If not, why not?

3. If the 1AR impact turns the Climate Bill, is it legitimate for the 2NR to:

   • extend the 2AC’s “non-unique” and “link turn” arguments (proving that the plan would uniquely cause the Climate Bill to pass)? If yes, why? If not, why not?

   • extend the 1NC impact (Climate Bill solves warming) and weigh it against the 1AR’s impact turn? If yes, why? If not, why not? And is it legitimate for the 2NR to read more evidence to support this argument?

This recently got posted to e-debate, seems pretty decent.

”
This is a discussion program that was made in 1992 featuring some of the
most successful coaches of American policy debate.

I have processed three programs from the third series.

The panelists are:
James J. Unger, American University (chair)
William Southworth, University of Redlands
Joel Rollins, University of Texas
Dallas Perkins, Harvard University
Jeff Parcher, Georgetown University

Part One – Evidence, Topicality, Judging, Impact analysis.
http://debatevideoblog.blogspot.com/2009/11/discussion-policy-debate-unger-and.html

Part Two – inherency, structure, generics, counterplans and real world
issues.
http://debatevideoblog.blogspot.com/2009/11/discussion-policy-debate-unger-company.html

Part Three – Presentation, Intrinsicness, Institutes and Direction
http://debatevideoblog.blogspot.com/2009/11/discussion-policy-debate-unger-and_08.html“

[T]o say that representations matter—insofar as [they] determine/influence policy outcomes—says little or nothing about which justifications should be used for policymaking. The representations presented by the 1AC that are justifications for action, instead of outcomes of the plan are neither mandatory nor inevitable outcomes of voting Aff.

Thus, the judge, at the end of the debate, should be able to choose (for themselves) why to vote Aff or Neg. Logically, one can choose the best arguments from the set of available reasons presented in the debate. Not every 1AC justification needs to be part of the final “package” of voting Aff. If one or more representations for voting for the plan is undesirable, they should not be used. If, at the end of the debate, positive/beneficial justifications for acting remain, the plan is desirable and the Aff should win.

With that, University of Georgia Debate Coach Casey Harrigan has levied a fundamental challenge to the theoretical viability of representational critique as currently conceptualized in academic policy debate. This article will defend Harrigan’s “judge choice” theory against the attacks of its critics and thereby contribute to the developing theoretical literature about representational critique.

Before examining “judge choice” and the criticisms that have been wrested upon it by critics, it is important to first clarify the target of Harrigan’s theory. In his initial article, Harrigan defines “representational critique” as “any argument that takes issue with justification for action that is not necessarily tied to outcome of action.” In other words, a critique of representations contests the accuracy, desirability, or ethics of one or more of the reasons that the affirmative has advanced to support a policy proposal but not the policy proposal itself.

Popular examples of this genre of argument (“Reps Ks”) include critiques of the way that a team or its authors describe terrorism, proliferation, nuclear weapons, global warming, or the environment. Indeed, the list of possible targets of representational critique is as long as the list of arguments that the affirmative can advance as justifications for the adoption of their plan.

Harrigan is critical of the way in which these representational critiques are currently debated. In practice, debates involving these arguments typically occur as follows:

The affirmative proposes a change in policy by the United States federal government. To support the necessity and desirability of this change, the first affirmative constructive outlines several reasons that the course of action they have proposed would avoid catastrophic consequences or accrue beneficial advantages.

In response, the negative criticizes one or more of the reasons that the affirmative has advanced to support the adoption of their plan. Even if the plan is desirable when compared with the status quo, the negative will argue, one or more of the ways that the affirmative chose to justify the plan has harmful consequences that ought to be rejected by the judge-critic.

The affirmative, faced with this objection to one or more of their representations, will respond with three basic strategies:

1. Defend the representation that the negative has criticized. This is the most straight-forward and least controversial of the possible affirmative responses to a representational critique.

2. Offer a permutation that calls for the passage of the plan but the rejection of the undesirable/harmful representation(s).

3. Contend that the plan should be the focus of the debate, not the representations used to support its enactment.

These latter two affirmative responses are met with a predictable negative rejoinder centered around the importance of representations to the process of policymaking and the outcome of policy change. Moreover, the negative will assert that the affirmative must defend all of the representations they have advanced in support of their plan because their failure to do so constitutes “severance”.

It is here that Harrigan’s “judge choice” theory contests the orthodoxy surrounding the practice of representational critique.

The judging community, unfortunately, has imported the logic of counterplan competition and ascribed to the dogma that every representation forwarded by the 1AC must be featured in a final evaluation of the plan – with little attendant reasoning for why this must be the case. … [I]mporting the theory of CP competition into these debates is a clear misapplication of the term. “Severance” implies an initial attachment—that the plan initially required that certain justifications be used for acting. In other words, the Neg assumes that the Aff had said that voting for the plan mandates that certain representations be used. … This is false. … [J]ustifications for action are frequently disconnected from outcome. … In this way, representations are different than, say, a policy advantage to the plan.

Elevating the representational critique to the status of a voting issue relies on a decision-making methodology that is inconsistent with that used by judges to evaluate other types of arguments. Critics of “judge choice” have argued that it is illegitimate for a judge to decide for themselves whether or not to consider one or more of the justifications presented by the affirmative to support their plan. While this discomfort with perceived “intervention” is well intentioned, it does not comport with the way in which judges resolve other types of debates.

For example, the affirmative may extend four responses to a disadvantage in their final rebuttal: it is not intrinsic, it does not link to the plan, the case outweighs the impact, and it is empirically denied. When evaluating this debate, the judge should consider each of these responses and determine whether they are sufficient to defeat the disadvantage. If the judge determines that the affirmative’s intrinsicness response is theoretically illegitimate, for example, s/he moves on to consider the affirmative’s contestation of the link. The intrinsicness response, because it has been defeated by the negative, is no longer a relevant argument for the judge to act upon when making their decision.

In the same way, the representational critique functions to persuade the judge that one or more of the justifications that the affirmative has presented ought not be considered as a reason to enact the plan.

In response, critics will appeal to the harm that has been done by the initial presentation itself of the affirmative’s contested justification. If the negative wins that the way the affirmative represented terrorism is racist, for example, ought not the affirmative lose for adopting a racist stance?

It is here that critics wrongly equate the theory of “judge choice” with the theory of “plan focus”. The latter theory requires that judges exclude consideration of the representations that have been offered to support the adoption of a policy proposal from their evaluation of the debate. “Judge choice,” on the other hand, accepts the necessity of representational critique but prescribes a mechanism for determining its relevance from the perspective of a logical decision-maker.

The crucial distinction, then, is between plan focus and policy relevance. When presented with multiple justifications for a policy change, a logical decision-maker can choose which of these justifications compels them to support or oppose the advocate’s proposal. If the decision-maker concludes that a policy change is warranted because of justification A, the undesirability or even harmfulness of justifications B and C ought not dissuade him or her from endorsing the change. The degree to which justifications B and C are bad ought not factor into the evaluation of justification A unless justifications B and/or C are intrinsic to the policy proposal.

This logic can be clearly applied to representational critiques. If the judge concludes at the end of the debate that the policy proposed by the affirmative ought to be enacted based on justification A, s/he should choose to endorse it based exclusively on justification A—justifications B and C are not part of the judge’s reasoning for voting affirmative. As such, the harmfulness of justifications B and C is not relevant to the judge’s endorsement of the plan.

Again, this view of the judge’s decision is consistent with the way that decisions are viewed in other circumstances. Returning the disadvantage example above, the undesirability of the affirmative’s intrinsicness response is not part of the judge’s reasoning when s/he decides to reject the disadvantage because the affirmative has won that it is empirically denied. When the judge articulates his or her decision, s/he does not reference the intrinsicness response: “I voted affirmative because the disadvantage is empirically denied”. Disputing this decision because the affirmative’s intrinsicness response is undesirable does not make sense.

In the same way, a judge evaluating a debate involving a representational critique can (and would) explain their decision in a way that is not reliant on the flawed justifications that the negative has indicted. “I voted affirmative because the plan is justified for reason A” cannot be logically disputed by arguing that reasons B and C are incorrect, undesirable, or unethical.

In order for the representational critique to become a reason to vote negative, the critics of “judge choice” need to establish the veracity of f two underlying decision-making assumptions:

1. The judge’s decision must account for every justification advanced by the affirmative. In other words, once an utterance is made, it cannot be discarded from the judge’s deliberation.

2. The harm done by the voicing of the objectionable representation is sufficient to disregard consideration of the plan’s desirability.

The first assumption results in illogical decision-making. Harrigan explains:

The debate judge should be treated like an intelligent and dynamic policy-maker. The affirmative should forward a proposal with a set of justifications. The Neg can criticize (via DAs, a counterplan, a K, etc.) the plan or the justifications. If the Neg wins that the plan is a bad idea, they win. If the Neg wins that the justification is bad, then the judge should reject that justification and determine whether the plan is a good idea for any other potential reason.

It is not logical to reject a policy proposal on the grounds that it could be supported by an inaccurate or undesirable justification. This model of decision-making does not comport with the way that individuals make everyday decisions.

For example, a friend could propose that you attend a baseball game with him. To convince you that this is a good idea, he could argue that attending the game will accrue three benefits: (1) it will be fun, (2) it will allow you to get enjoy delicious ballpark fare, and (3) it will allow you to throw batteries at the opposing team’s right-fielder.

Being a reasonable, law-abiding, and non-violent person, you take issue with the third justification that your friend has offered to convince you to attend the game: you have no desire to throw batteries at the opposing team’s right fielder (Sammy Sosa has retired, after all) and indeed you think that this very idea is morally heinous.

Nonetheless, you agree with your friend’s first and second arguments (it will be fun and there will be good food), so you decide to agree to attend the game with him for those reasons but not for the third reason (throwing batteries).

In order for the very presentation of the third reason to become a reason not to attend the game, it must be the case that throwing batteries at the opposing right-fielder is intrinsic to attendance at the game. If it is, then the benefits of attending the game might be outweighed by the disadvantages of attending and you might decide not to take your friend up on his offer.

Most representational critiques do not raise objections that are intrinsic to the plan’s adoption. To use one of Harrigan’s examples, the affirmative might propose to disarm the United States’ nuclear arsenal in order to accrue two advantages: proliferation and biodiversity. If the negative critiques the way the affirmative represents the environment within their biodiversity advantage, they have not advanced a criticism that is intrinsic to U.S. disarmament. If the negative wins their argument—that the way the affirmative represents environmental harms is undesirable/harmful—then the judge should not consider the biodiversity advantage as a reason to endorse the plan. The judge could still choose to endorse the plan, however, because it would accrue the benefit outlined by the proliferation advantage.

It is illogical, then, to consider a representational critique as a reason to reject the plan if other reasons to endorse the plan have been presented.

This, then, requires the advocate of the “judge choice” theory to address the second underlying assumption of critics: that the harm done by the voicing of the objectionable representation is sufficient to disregard consideration of the plan’s desirability.

Harrigan addresses this argument by framing it as a reactionary move:

Interestingly, the contrary position—that you should hold speakers to every reason they cite as justification and use it to assess their policy—is one of the most reactionary and anti-critical stances one could take. It prioritizes who speaks over what is spoken about. It ignores content for form. It punishes instead of compromises. And, fundamentally, it is a tactic used by conservative political forces to crush progressivism. Do the critique folk really want to be in this company?

This argument can be clarified with an example. Imagine that during the years before the Civil War a bill to outlaw slavery is under consideration by the U.S. Senate. Advocates of the bill advance a variety of arguments: they insist that slavery violates the fundamental human dignity of slaves and they argue that the abolition of slavery is necessary to maintain the competitiveness of industry in the Northern states. Those that believe the first justification find the second justification objectionable and indeed immoral: it relies on the assumption that slavery can be justified by economic calculations and therefore fails to acknowledge the inherent dignity of all human beings.

Pretend that you are a neutral Senator deliberating over the bill—you are not certain which way to vote and are willing to listen to all arguments made by each side. After giving each side a fair hearing, you determine that both the “fundamental human dignity” justification for endorsing the bill and the criticism of the “Northern competitiveness” justification are true. What should you do?

The “judge choice” theory would argue that you should vote in favor of the bill on the basis of the “fundamental human dignity” justification. Even though one of the justifications for the bill (“Northern competitiveness”) was objectionable, it is not the reason that you are endorsing it—your vote reflects the first justification, not the second.

On the other hand, the decision-making model advanced by the critics of the “judge choice” theory would require the advocates of the bill to defend both the “fundamental human dignity” justification and the “Northern competitiveness” justification. A neutral Senator evaluating these justifications would therefore be put in a difficult position: should they endorse the bill and thereby support the second, objectionable justification? Or should they reject the bill because one of the justifications offered in its support was objectionable?

Negative teams defending representational critiques often advance arguments that would require resolving this conundrum in the latter fashion. Arguing that “the damage has already been done,” for example, deprives the judge of the logical opportunity to reject some justifications for a proposed course of action while approving of others.

It is here that an important distinction needs to be made: judges should evaluate each of the justifications offered for and against a proposed course of action, but that does not mean that they need to act upon them. The “judge choice” theory does not allow the affirmative to “take back” a justification that they have advanced in support of their plan. Instead, it simply acknowledges that the loss of one justification does not in itself prove that there is no justification for the plan’s adoption.

Importing the concept of “severance” from counterplan theory, therefore, is inappropriate. In the context of a counterplan, “severance” means that the affirmative’s permutation does not include the entirety of the plan and therefore alters the object of the judge’s decision-making. This is categorically distinct from “severance” in the context of representational critiques. Instead of altering the object of the judge’s decision-making, “severance” in this latter context alters only the criteria upon which the judge makes their decision. And in contrast to a severance permutation advanced against a counterplan, “severance” in the context of the critique does not really “sever” at all—the affirmative still presented an objectionable justification for the plan’s adoption, but it is the judge that subsequently eliminates this justification from their tally of “reasons to do the plan”.

As Harrigan explains, the “judge choice” theory alters the function of representation critiques but does not sap them of their strategic utility.

There isn’t “no cost” to presenting poor justifications for action on the Aff. In all likelihood, you’d lose your entire advantage. … The K still has value—but it’s meaning changes to a “reason not to use such representation” instead of a DA to the plan. … The Reps K isn’t a DA to the plan. It can never be “[Objectionable] Reps cause extinction – outweighs the case”, because the conclusion of that statement is that those justifications should never be used for acting in the first place. Translation: “No Link, Judge”.

Again, critics of the “judge choice” theory assume that the damaging effects of an inaccurate, undesirable, or unethical justification are accrued regardless of whether the judge chooses to act based on that justification. Returning to the disarmament example, a judge that votes affirmative based on the proliferation advantage but not the environment advantage is not supporting the justification that the negative has critiqued. This is a critical distinction because it explains why the negative’s insistence that representations shape policy enactment miss the point: only those representations that are acted upon shape the enactment of a policy. If the judge chooses to enact the plan based on a second justification, the disadvantages to the first justification are not relevant even if representations have policy relevance.

Harrigan explains:

Finally, what about the Doty card and other “reps matter” style arguments that I mentioned before? Well, representations matter—but those arguments presume that the reps actually used influence policy. My position is that the judge can choose which representations to use for policy enactment, so Doty et al. applies to the 1AC but not the final position chosen by the judge that is a reason to vote Aff because it affirms the plan.

Roger Solt, perhaps the most influential debate theorist of recent decades, agrees with Harrigan’s view:

A focus on the “representations” employed in debates has, of late, to some extent displaced the previous concentration on discourse. While discourse focuses on the words employed, representations involve the broader images that those words create and convey. Nonetheless, the problems associated with representational focus in policy debate are rather similar to those linked to discursive focus. First, if one is proposing a plan of action, the representations employed are secondary and instrumental means of justifying an ultimate policy conclusion. Thus, even if representations are in part discredited, the overall policy [end page 50] conclusion may hold. Second, representations are always partial, always limited by personal perspective, and always prone to interpretation. There is no such thing as an absolutely clear, perfectly accurate representation of something. We thus can quibble endlessly about the correctness of an image. But the fact remains that we are forced ultimately to act on the basis of imperfect depictions and recognitions.

The critics’ only recourse, at this point, is to argue that the very introduction of the harmful representations in the first place is sufficient to disregard consideration of the plan in favor of punishing the offending team for their transgression. Faced with the logic of the “judge choice” theory, the representational-critique-as-voting-issue stance must out of necessity resort to a defense of the punishment paradigm.

While a rigorous examination of ballot-as-punishment is beyond the scope of the article, it is worth mentioning David Glass’s theory of “counter-topicality” as a possible complement to Harrigan’s “judge choice” theory. Glass contends that the negative ought to be limited to only those arguments that are competitive with the resolution:

This new conception of debate – that the negative is limited to arguments which compete with the resolution – has other consequences. First, it also limits the type of Critiques which can be run. Critiques would also have to be competitive with the Resolution, as opposed to being simply linked off of any word which the Affirmative says that the Negative deems objectionable. For example, given this year’s topic, criticisms of the United States’ endorsement of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations would be fair game, since you could not simultaneously endorse those criticisms and endorse the resolution. However were the affirmative team to use a “bad word”… for example, if an affirmative speaker made a sexist remark, criticisms of that remark would not be a basis for a negative ballot, because while it may be bad or objectionable that the Affirmative used sexist language, that bad act does not compete with the Resolution (you can simultaneously reject the sexist language and endorse that the resolution is correct).

Is the very fact that the Affirmative can “get away” with bad language in a Counter-Topicality framework an argument against the framework? There are other tools available to the judge to punish bad language other than to vote negative – such as docking speaker points. Second, one may argue that the issues of fairness and preparation are higher standards, because debate is impossible without them. Once you allow language criticisms, you simply fall back into the framework where arguments which do not compete with the resolution are acceptable – and you need to find an alternate line which allows those arguments but limits out the infinite number of performances which the negative may resort to as an alternate approach to the affirmative. Further there is no limit to the number of things about the affirmative team or about the language that the affirmative uses, or about the debate process itself, that the negative could argue is objectionable – and an increasingly large number of these may be much harder to predict than the use of sexist language; this is why the Counter-Topicality framework is preferable, and that the Negative must be limited to arguments which compete with the resolution. Such a framework still gives the Negative a lot to say, and it allows the Affirmative to reasonably prepare. (One “real world” example – if a Senator was arguing against sending troops to Iraq, but used bad language in making her point, would you reject her arguments and send troops to Iraq as a rejection of her discourse? Or would you simply think worse of her, but in the absence of arguments which compete with the idea that sending troops to Iraq is bad, endorse the policy position that we should not send troops to Iraq?)

Glass’s theory of “counter-topicality” is therefore consistent with Harrigan’s theory of “judge choice” in offering a foundation for logical decision-making. In order for the representational critique to reclaim its status as a voting issue, its advocates must either explain how it can be reconciled with a logical model of decision-making or defend that the necessity for punishment is enough to justify deviating from it.

Works Cited:

Glass, Dr. David. “Counter-Topicality: An Instrument of Fairness,” Rostrum, Volume 79, Number 7, March 2005, Available Online at http://www.nflonline.org/Rostrum/Pol0305Glass.

Harrigan, Casey. “‘Judge Choice’: The Illogic of Representational Critique,” Georgia Debate Union, November 6, 2009, Available Online at http://www.georgiadebate.org/2009/11/judge-choice-the-illogic-of-representational-critique.

Solt, Roger E. “Debate’s Culture of Narcissism,” Contemporary Argumentation & Debate, Volume 25, September 2004, Available Online via Communication & Mass Media Complete, p. 50-51.

I mentioned this to a few people at st marks and was asked to post the card in question (more solt gold in the article)

Roger Solt, Debate Coach, University of Kentucky, 2003 (“The Disposition of Counterplans and Permutations: The Case for Logical, Limited Conditionality” – DRG) http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Solt2003.htm

The notion that conditional argument is somehow unethical strikes me as even less compelling. Considering several different alternatives does not, on its face, seem morally problematic. Nor does it seem immoral, generally speaking, to modify one’s position to some extent over the course of a discussion or a debate. One might even defend such a course as ethically superior to the approach of adopting a dogmatic stance permitting neither compromise nor modification based on new insights.

In the quarterfinals of this past weekend’s New Trier Season Opener, a negative team extended two counterplans with contradictory net-benefits in the 2NR and justified doing so because the affirmative “conceded the thesis of conditionality.” Having already discussed this hypothetical with several debaters and judges, it is clear that it is both interesting and confounding. Read the blow-by-blow below the fold and chime in with your thoughts.

The affirmative case argued that the Supreme Court should strike down marriage promotion policies in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program on the grounds that they violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They argued that this was necessary to solve Patriarchy/Domestic Violence, Racism, and Commodification.

The 1NC included (among many other things) two counterplans: the first had Congress remove marriage promotion from TANF and had the Supreme Court rule on class-based affirmative action on Equal Protection grounds—the net-benefit was the Hollow Hope DA; the second had the Supreme Court strike down marriage promotion restrictions based on substantive due process—the net-benefit was an equal protection bad DA.

Both counterplans were conditional. The affirmative initiated a “conditionality bad” argument in the 2AC but did not extend it in the 1AR.

The 2NR extended both counterplans and both net-benefits.

Several questions to consider:

1. Is it theoretically legitimate to extend both counterplans in the 2NR?

2. How should the judge evaluate the debate? Should s/he compare each counterplan and net-benefit to the case while pretending that the other counterplan and net-benefit do not exist?

3. Does the status quo remain a logical option? Can the judge kick one counterplan or both counterplans and independently weigh one or both of the net-benefits against the case?

4. What does the 2AR need to say in order to win?

I found this going through a bunch of old files of “misc” stuff that I never organized into an actual file.

Larry Cata Backer* Executive Director, Tulsa Comparative & International Law Center, Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law; B.A. 1977 Brandeis University; M.P.P. 1979 Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; J.D. 1982 Columbia University University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review Summer, 1999

Our goal must be fairness. Fairness is a condition with perhaps an immutable definition but with a complex and transitory application. Fairness tolerates difference, but fairness ought not to tolerate disadvantage, either within a group or between groups. Fairness can be a trap and a cover for promoting separation. I mention only one problem here, that of the measure of fairness. Much has been made of the difference between equality of opportunity and equality of result. n105 Both contain within them culturally significant risk. Equality of opportunity as a measure of fairness contains strong leanings toward sameness. It suggests unity and minimizes difference yet provides little in the way of mechanisms for mediating situations where difference has an effect on the quality of opportunity. It can provide less protection against abuse by the dominant in a society of difference. At its limit it can suggest implosion of difference and provide a potent cultural weapon for involuntary assimilation n106 and disappearance.  n107 On the [*875] other hand, equality of result as a measure of fairness contains strong leanings toward difference. It suggests separation and minimizes sameness yet provides little in the way of mechanisms for mediating situations where difference would overcome any sense of meta-group cohesion. It can provide less protection against abuse by non- dominant groups and can result in reverse hegemony. It suggests the power of cultural veto by the smallest minority. It thus contains the danger of providing little protection against the unfairness of the smaller (instead of the larger) groups. At its limit it can suggest explosion of difference and provide a potent cultural weapon for separation.  n108

Fairness requires that we be willing to acknowledge as part of our cultural common sense that we all are part of the same group. Without a master unity, our differences can overcome us. Concentrating on what pulls us together as a group vitiates the strength of what distinguishes us as people. This is no task reserved solely for the group suffering disadvantage, but is the greatest challenge to the group imposing disadvantage on others. To suggest that no such meta-commonality exists is to suggest separation and disunity. Without a commitment to cultural unity, there is no point in engaging in dialog.

The penalty for rejecting an affirmation of sameness is the loss of the means of speaking in culturally significant ways; the ultimate penalty for rejection of sameness at some level is separation. Unless we acknowledge our differences within a context of shared culture at some meaningful level (and not at some abstract level of meaninglessness) we increase rather than decrease the separation effects of difference. Groups listen in culturally significant ways only to “family.” If your are not family, then you have nothing culturally significant to say. At its limit, rejection of sameness at a meaningful level suggests that as a result of difference we cannot [*876] speak the same cultural language. Babel and recent world history instruct us that the consequence is a scattering.

Throwdown with Scott Phillips

This post will be in more 1AR form than nuanced explanation.

Extend our offense- pics artificially inflate bad disads by creating any risk of a link analysis which skews research and pre round prep focus. We’ll defend the whole plan, but forcing us to defend isolated parts in a vacuum is unpredictable and doesn’t reflect real world literature. There is no logical limit to pics- they can change the scope or implementation of the plan in unpredictable ways.

AT: Fix your plan

-no plan is immune to pics, you can’t just “fix” it. Fixing involves making the plan as vague as possible like “provide water africa” a la the hooch 2 years ago that are bad for education.

AT: You were just defending consult

-This is a blog about switch side debate.

AT: Who runs these 1 penny counterplans

-Lots of people run CP’s like grandfather 10% of the permits that the aff is never prepared for, they have solvency advocates and people win on them.

AT: Solvency Advocates check

-Empirically denied- judges are unwilling to firmly hold the neg to this standard- just having a link card is usually good enough. Proliferation of internet blogs (and law review footnotes) allow cards to be found for anything

AT:If solvency advocates exist and net benefits exist, then maybe it’s a real question in the literature.

-”real question” does not equal- far and good for debate. There are lots of “real questions” like how are we going to pay for this that in debate we chose to ignore

AT:The counterplan tests whether the Aff would be a better idea if done slightly differently

-If your disad is not enough to outweigh the case, it sucks. Why should we give the neg a mechanism to make crappy arguments round winners? Sounds a lot like you are defending a K JC…

AT:The damage to the 2AC strategy is done? What strategy are you talking about?

-a good 2ac will not read offense solved by the pic because that would be a waste of time, if the negative then has the CP go away due to theory the aff is left without some of their best arguments

AT:Reciprocal – they inflate the solvency deficit to the same degree. If you can’t win that this outweighs the disad it means either the CP isn’t competitive or you deserve to lose.

-This is false- its easier to construe a net benefit with an impact “including roy in the HC provided by the plan is unpopular” then it is to win a solvency deficit “providing for roy is key to solve”.

AT:A strong 1NC barrage of defensive case arguments and DAs that turn the case accomplishes the same effect

-Yes it does, it takes 10X as much time as reading a 1 sentence cp text which makes it different

AT:This argument also justifies banning all CPs because they force you to make certain solvency deficit arguments and not others

-False, you can use your whole plan as offense against non plan inclusive cps

AT: This neg ability to focus on a specific part of the plan is justified by the aff ability to set the focus of the entire debate

-It does not logically follow that because the aff picked X the neg gets to pick a subset of X-this is a claim without a warrant

AT: See above – aff gets to choose their side in almost every PIC debate. “penny saved” counterplans aren’t viable because the neg can’t win that the DA outweighs the solvency deficit

-This is empirically denied- gfather example above, font pics, word pics, exclude a state, exclude a sub group like natives the list goes on an on

AT: Roy’s counterplans are stupid for reasons other than that they’re PICs, they’re either only textually or not competitive. This logic is the equivalent of banning DAs because you think politics is stupid

- you are hinting at some standard for competition that “only allows the good ones” but you conveniently leave it out because it doesn’t exist. This is the classic problem with PICS, one out of 100 is good/fair/the center of the debate about that aff- the rest are nonsense.

AT: “Using a different mechanism” is the same as a PIC+an additional plank

-No-  USFG do cap and trade vs Japan inject iron oxide into oceans. I think you are trying to say “including the agent makes it a pic” which I think is arguable- it includes none of the plan ACTION. I don’t think if a cp that has a different agent doing a different action includes 1 word or 1 letter or is in the same font as the plan that makes it a pic.

AT: the alternative energy PIC is an example of a “different mechanism” CP.

-Its the exact same mechanism, it just uses a different name

AT:

Running the net-benefit without the CP is overly constraining – proving that the plan is sub-optimal and that a viable, competitive alternative exists negates the aff. To answer this statement you’d have to argue neg fiat bad, and that (or even just no PICs) would regress us to 1960s, Greg Varley era debate where the aff always wins.

-It “overly constrains” bad arguments with low probabilities, true. PICS bad does not logically rely on no neg fiat, you have no warrant for that claim.

AT:

(to use a real world analogy, the argument that the fact that the plan is an improvement over the SQ is a sufficient reason to merit adoption would hold no water. see the health care debate – rational policymakers don’t adopt policies if better alternatives that are smaller than the plan exist. If the public option PIC succeeds, Obama loses.)

-Yes look at the real world- these kind of minor counter proposals suck and guarantee nothing ever gets done. But more importantly there are constraints in debate like the topic and time which make this model a bad one to import.

As is becoming an annoying trend, Stefan has beaten me to the punch on a how to debate the states CP post- you can read it here http://www.planetdebate.com/blogs/view/357

For an aff perspective here are some posts I made last year

http://spdebate.blogspot.com/2008/07/states-cp-part-1.html

http://spdebate.blogspot.com/2008/07/states-cp-part-2-theory.html

http://spdebate.blogspot.com/2008/09/states-cp-part-3-thinking-strategically.html