The 3NR

Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!, International Studies Quarterly 1992 (36)

For those of you going paperless this is worth checking out, you can find all the info here.

Christina Tallungan assembled a list of the camp affs available online with thier plan texts and advantages.

List_of_Camp_Affirmatives_(August)[1]

179 Eee PC’s on woot today- www.woot.com

Is kicking into full gear, you can find it on their newly redesigned web page here

One of the important arguments to win when going for heg bad is a solvency takeout- not that the plan doesn’t boost hegemony, but that hegemony doesn’t reduce conflict. Here is a link to a sick cato article that has a bunch of links to other good articles in it on this point. So good it could be a blinders K card…

Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions.

But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.

Mike Horowitz, a Prof at Penn but more importantly the person who found the Murray card, has a new book coming out with obvious utility for this topic.

Dear Friends and Colleagues:

I am pleased to announce the release of my first book, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics.  It is now available for purchase at Amazon.com, Barnes & Noble, and other places.  It is available in paperback, hardcover, and kindle editions.  Published by Princeton University Press, the book assesses the factors that drive the diffusion of new military innovations throughout the international system and the way these diffusion patterns shape international politics.  It covers historical cases such as battlefleet and carrier warfare, contemporary challenges such as nuclear weapons and suicide terrorism, and the way the information age may impact the future of warfare and American power.  As the press page states:

The Diffusion of Military Power examines how the financial and organizational challenges of adopting new methods of fighting wars can influence the international balance of power. Michael Horowitz argues that a state or actor wishing to adopt a military innovation must possess both the financial resources to buy or build the technology and the internal organizational capacity to accommodate any necessary changes in recruiting, training, or operations. How countries react to new innovations–and to other actors that do or don’t adopt them–has profound implications for the global order and the likelihood of war.

Horowitz looks at some of the most important military innovations throughout history, including the advent of the all-big-gun steel battleship, the development of aircraft carriers and nuclear weapons, and the use of suicide terror by nonstate actors. He shows how expensive innovations can favor wealthier, more powerful countries, but also how those same states often stumble when facing organizationally complicated innovations. Innovations requiring major upheavals in doctrine and organization can disadvantage the wealthiest states due to their bureaucratic inflexibility and weight the balance of power toward smaller and more nimble actors, making conflict more likely. This book provides vital insights into military innovations and their impact on U.S. foreign policy, warfare, and the distribution of power in the international system.

There is a button on the right side that says “download as mp3″ which you can use to download a computer voice reading the article.